Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

Louise Mann v. Samuel P. Fredrickson, Riddle
Services, Inc., and Does 1 Through 10 Inclusive :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Albert W. Gray; Smith and Glauser, P.C.; Attorney for all Appellee.
William R. Rawlings; Law Offices of William R. Rawlings; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Mann v. Fredrickson, No. 20050955 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6096

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Louise Mann,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20050955 - CA
SAMUEL P. FREDRICKSON, RIDDLE
SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1
THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE,
Defendants/Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Deno Himonas presiding.

ALBERT W. GRAY
Smith & Glauser, P.C.
7351 S. Union Park Ave., Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84047
Telephone: (801) 562-5355
Attorney for all Appellee

WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS, #6784
Law Offices of William R. Rawlings
11576 S. State St., #401
Draper, Utah 84020
Telephone: (801) 553-0505
Attorney for Appellant

Counsel for Appellant does request oral argument.

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAY 2 4 2006

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Louise Mann,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
Case No. 20050955 - CA
SAMUEL P. FREDRICKSON, RIDDLE
SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1
THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE,
Defendants/Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Deno Himonas presiding.
ALBERT W. GRAY
Smith & Glauser, P.C.
7351 S. Union Park Ave., Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84047
Telephone: (801) 562-5355
Attorney for all Appellee

WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS, #6784
Law Offices of William R. Rawlings
11576 S. State St., #401
Draper, Utah 84020
Telephone: (801) 553-0505
Attorney for Appellant

Counsel for Appellant does request oral argument.

Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

RESPONSE TO FACTS STATED BY APPELLEES

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

2

DISCUSSION

3

I. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT

3

II. THE ISSUE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IS PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT AND SHOULD BE HEARD AND DECIDED
8
III. MS. MANN HAS RAISED THE APPROPRIATE ISSUES TO
CHALLENGE THE JURY VERDICT

11

IV. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 28 WAS IMPROPERLY GIVEN, AS IT
WAS CONFUSING, MISLEADING AND NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SERVE AS DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF
THE CASE
12
A. Mann Properly Objected to Jury Instruction No. 28

13

B. Jury Instruction No. 28 Was Misleading to the Jury and Was Not
Supported by Sufficient Evidence to Serve as Defendants' Theory of the
Case

14

CONCLUSION

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

17

ADDENDA
A.
B.

Statement and Diagram Made by Fredrickson at the Scene
Judgment on the Verdict

Table of Authorities
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-62

6

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-69

4, 6

Cases
Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n., 470 P.2d 393 (Utah 1970)

9

Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975)

9

Holmstromv. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239

13

Newsome v. Gold Cross Serv., Inc., 779 P.2d 692 (Utah Ct.App. 1989)

14

Paulos v. Covenant Transportation, Inc., 2004 UT App. 35, 86 P.3d 752

14

R.T. NielsonCo. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,40 P.3d 1119

13

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985)

9,10

Weber Basin v. Nelson, 358 P.2d 81 (Utah 1960)

ii

11

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Louise Mann,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
SAMUEL P. FREDRICKSON, RIDDLE
SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1
THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE,

Case No. 20050955 - CA

Defendants/Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

RESPONSE TO FACTS STATED BY APPELLEES
Ms. Mann's opening brief does not merely reargue her position at trial, but
rather includes those facts relevant to the issues presented before this Court. The
facts which the Appellees allege are merely a renewal of Ms. Mann's trial
argument are included only to the extent necessary to conform to the decision
made by Judge Himonas in his denial of Ms. Mann's Motion for a New Trial.
Any perceived defect in Ms. Mann's attempt to marshal the facts was
inadvertent, as it was her intent to limit the facts to those relevant to the narrow
issues before this Court. Mann's inclusion of information which "hardly could be
a factual statement construed in a light most favorable to Appellees" was
necessary in order to support the theory which formed the basis of Judge

Himonas' decision. (See Appellees' Brief, pp. 6-7.) Throughout his brief,
Fredrickson ignores the theory adopted by the trial court which was used to uphold
the verdict. Rather than merely adopt Fredrickson's account of the accident in
order to uphold the verdict, Judge Himonas based his decision on the facts asserted
by Fredrickson plus a selectively removed portion of the testimony of Ms. Mann.
(See R. 575, pp. 1-2). Ms. Mann included her full statement from which Judge
Himonas selected an isolated portion to form his opinion.
Ms. Mann maintains the same position adopted by Judge Himonas; that
being that Frederickson's account of the accident does not support the verdict.
Mann believes his account, standing alone, contradicts the verdict. Ms. Mann
would willingly adopt the Appellees' version of the facts so long as they are
complete.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and her motion for a new trial because there was no
evidence to support the finding that Ms. Mann was 100% at fault for the accident,
as concluded by the jury. The trial court erred in its reliance upon isolated and
contradictory facts as the sole basis for denying Appellant's motion for a new trial.
Ms. Mann has complied with the requirements imposed by the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, and properly presents the issues raised before this Court
pursuant to actions taken in conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

The issue of insufficiency of the evidence is sufficiently preserved by Ms. Mann's
Motion for a New Trial presented to the trial court.
The trial court erred in the giving of Jury Instruction No. 28, as it was
confusing and misleading to the jury, and was not supported by sufficient evidence
to serve as the defendants' theory of the case.
DISCUSSION
I.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT

The record below is free from any evidence that would support a verdict
apportioning 100% of the liability of the subject accident to Ms. Mann. The
verdict rendered by the jury was entirely inconsistent with the evidence presented
at trial, and the decisions of the trial court should accordingly be reversed.
Fredrickson attacks the Appellant's marshalling of the facts, asserting that
she failed to do so as required under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Fredrickson makes no reference in the argument portion of his brief to any
specific facts omitted by Ms. Mann, but merely claims she re-argued her position
at trial and failed to meet her burden. There are some references to additional
facts which Fredrickson feels are relevant in his response to the facts asserted by
Mann in her opening brief.
Appellees note that Mann fails to include the fact that Fredrickson was two
to three car lengths behind her, had been following her for five or six blocks and
that she was never aware of his following her despite traveling 10 miles per hour
in a posted 45 mile per hour zone. (See Appellees' Brief at pp .6-7.) Fredrickson
3

erroneously asserts that Mann failed to mention the fact that Officer Brown was
unaware of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-69(2) (See Appellees' Brief at p. 8); Mann
made specific reference to this fact in her marshaling of the facts. (See
Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 9.) Fredrickson criticizes Mann's inclusion of the
fact that she "made a normal stop, and had stopped for 10 or 15 seconds before
Mr. Fredrickson's vehicle struck her from behind[,]" arguing that this can in no
way be construed in a light favorable to the Appellees. (See Appellees' Brief at
pp. 6-7). This statement was not included to reargue the matter, but was included
because this statement was relied upon by Judge Himonas in his decision finding
that the evidence at trial supported the verdict. (R. 575, pp. 1-2).
Fredrickson fails to address or recognize the findings articulated by Judge
Himonas throughout his brief. Judge Himonas examined the record and because
the evidence clearly fails to support the verdict below, he chose to incorporate a
selected a portion of the above statement made by Ms. Mann and combine it with
Fredrickson's assertion that she slammed on her brakes. Id. Only after pairing
together these isolated, dissected bits of information, gleaned from the record of a
five-day trial, did Judge Himonas find that the verdict was supported by sufficient
evidence. It is worth noting that this theory was entirely created by the trial court,
and was not suggested as a plausible theory by either party before the trial court.
The Appellant has found it difficult if not impossible to compile evidence
which supports the verdict apportioning 100% of the fault to Ms. Mann and
completely exonerating Fredrickson. In an effort to ensure fulfillment of the
4

duty to marshal the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Ms. Mann
will incorporate those facts which Fredrickson implies were wrongfully omitted,
and will demonstrate that there is simply insufficient evidence to justify a verdict
allocating 100% of the liability to Ms. Mann. The following is a recitation of the
facts relevant to liability marshaled as much as possible to support the verdict:
•

On the day of the incident Fredrickson and Mann were traveling
north along Redwood Road in a construction area. (R. 574, p. 14.)
Fredrickson, who was followed by four or five other vehicles,
followed Mann for approximately five or six blocks. (R. 574, pp. 1516.) Fredrickson entered the construction area, slowed down and
continued to follow Mann when she suddenly stopped in the middle
of the road such that Fredrickson did not have enough time to stop.
(R. 574, p. 16.)

•

At no time before the accident did Fredrickson recall taking his eyes
off of Mann's vehicle. (R. 574, p. 83.) Fredrickson stated that he
had no warning that Mann was going to stop, and tried to stop by
slamming on his brakes; this caused his truck to fishtail and he
collided with the back of Mann's vehicle at an angle. (R. 574, p. 16.)
Fredrickson stated that at the time of the accident he was very
surprised that Mann stopped suddenly, and could see no reason why
she stopped. (R. 574, p. 17.) Mann stated that she did not see
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Fredrickson's truck behind her prior to the accident and could not
estimate the impact speed. (R. 573, pp. 73-74.)
•

Officer Matt Brown performed the investigation on the scene of the
accident and testified that the accident occurred in the middle of the
road. (R. 573, pp. 34, 41.) While Officer Brown's report did
mention that Fredrickson's vehicle was traveling too fast and too
close, he testified that he was not aware of Utah Code Ann. §41-669(2), prohibiting unlawful sudden stops. (R. 573, pp. 35, 43.)

The above recitation substantially mirrors those facts set forth by
Fredrickson in his brief and Mann believes the facts above are insufficient to
uphold the jury's allocation of 100% of liability to Ms. Mann. Without any
reference to Ms. Mann's version of the facts1, and based solely on the information
provided by Fredrickson there is no evidence which justifies the jury's
apportioning 100% of the liability to Ms. Mann. The verdict completely absolves
Fredrickson from any negligence, despite the duty imposed on following cars by
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-62(1). Additionally, while Fredrickson contends that there
were as many as five vehicles following the furniture truck he was driving, he
offers no reason why he was the only one unable to control his vehicle in response
to the sudden stop made by Ms. Mann, as the collision involved no other vehicles.

1

Mann asserted that she was traveling through a construction zone, made a normal, controlled stop
responding to instructions from a flagger controlling traffic, and after being stopped for 10-15 seconds was
struck from behind by Fredrickson's vehicle. (R.573, pp. 18-19.)
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Absent from the facts as set forth by Fredrickson is the fact that while
Fredrickson at the time of the accident "saw no reason why [Mann] would have
made such a sudden stop;" (R. 574, p. 17), he stated that once he got out of the
truck, he then "first noticed there was a flagger standing approximately 20 feet
from the scene of the accident." (R. 574, p. 19.) Fredrickson makes multiple
references to Mann's lack of justification for her stop in his brief (see Appellees'
Brief at 23-25), completely disregarding the fact that there was an individual
controlling traffic, whom he did not see until after the accident. The statement and
sketch submitted by Fredrickson as Trial Exhibit 11 (attached here as Addendum
A) makes reference to an individual controlling traffic, again, an individual
Fredrickson was not aware of until after the accident occurred.
While Mann is required to marshal the facts in the light most favorable to
the verdict, ignoring clearly relevant facts proffered by the opposing party
overstates and goes beyond that duty.
Further, the trial court had all of the evidence before them in ruling on Ms.
Mann's Motion for a New Trial. Due to the lack of evidence to support the verdict
in Fredrickson's account alone, the trial judge found that his testimony coupled
with a portion of what Fredrickson refers to as Ms. Mann's "mutually exclusive
theory" together were needed to justify the verdict. (R. 575, pp. 1-2.) In arriving
at this conclusion, the trial court interpreted Ms. Mann's statement that she had
been stopped for 10-15 seconds prior to the impact to mean that she was aware of
the flagger controlling traffic for 10-15 seconds and then slammed on her brakes at
7

the last moment. Id. This theory was created and invented by the trial court sua
sponte. Frankly, even were this interpretation a valid representation of the facts,
Fredrickson had a duty not only to be paying attention to the car in front of him,
but to surrounding circumstances and especially to an individual controlling traffic
in a construction zone. It was Fredrickson's own testimony that he did not see the
flagger until after exiting his large truck after the accident occurred. (R. 574, p.
19.) The jury's verdict did not merely split liability or attribute the larger portion
thereof to Ms. Mann, rather, the jury found her to be 100% responsible, and
completely exonerated Fredrickson. This simply makes no sense based upon the
evidence presented. Accordingly, Ms. Mann respectfully recommends to this
Court that the rulings of the trial court should be reversed in the interest of justice.
IL

THE ISSUE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IS
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT AND SHOULD BE HEARD
AND DECIDED
While the Appellant did not move for a directed verdict during the trial in

this matter, it is clearly appropriately presented the issue of insufficiency of the
evidence to this Court. Following the return of the jury's verdict, Ms. Mann did
move for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, which was denied. The trial
court conceded that the denial of Mann's motion was made without reasoning or
justification. (R. 575, p. 4.) Fredrickson did not object to the raising of the motion
at that time, but does so for the first time here on appeal. Generally, "failure to
raise the point below precludes its consideration [on appeal]." State v. Carter, 707
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P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985). Having failed to object on these grounds below,
Fredrickson may not raise this contention here.
Further, this argument by Fredrickson is misplaced. While the general rule
precludes a party who failed to move for a directed verdict from moving for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and appellate review, "an exception exists
where plain error appears in the record and would result in a miscarriage of
justice." Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975). The lack of evidence
supporting the jury's allocation of 100% of the liability in this matter to Ms.
Mann, and the failure of the trial court to grant the Appellant's Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict results in a miscarriage of justice, and this
issue should be considered by this Court.
Fredrickson contends that the entire issue of "insufficiency of the evidence"
should be barred by Ms. Mann's failure to move for directed verdict. The above
noted general rule and exception apply only to those motions as brought under
Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to move for directed verdict
is not a procedural bar for a motion for a new trial brought pursuant to Rule 59 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Fredrickson cites to Brigham v. Moon Lake
Elec. Ass 'n., 470 P.2d 393 (Utah 1970) as support for the assertion that failure to
move for directed verdict precludes the issue of sufficiency of the evidence from
appellate review. Commentary directly following those excerpts relied upon by
Fredrickson demonstrates that his position overstates the rule and ignores the
distinction between Rule 50 and Rule 59. The Brigham court stated:
9

"In case a party desires to challenge the verdict of a jury upon the ground
that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence, he must do so by a motion
for a new trial, unless during the trial he raised the legal question involved
by a motion for a nonsuit or for a directed verdict. Unless he has presented
either a motion for a nonsuit or for a directed verdict, the trial court has had
no opportunity to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence during the
trial, and cannot do so unless a motion for a new trial upon the ground of
the insufficiency of the evidence is presented to it." Brigham 470 P.2d at
397.
Contrary to the theory advanced by Fredrickson, that failure to move for
directed verdict forecloses further review of the sufficiency of the evidence,
Brigham stands for the premise that the role of the appellate court is to review the
actions of the court below, and that the issue of sufficiency of the evidence must
be presented and ruled on by the trial court in order for this Court to review the
matter. Id. This is accomplished either through a motion for directed verdict or
through a motion for a new trial on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence.
The issue of insufficiency of the evidence to uphold the verdict has been
appropriately raised by Ms. Mann based upon the lower court's rulings on the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the ruling on the motion for a
new trial due to insufficiency of the evidence. Ms. Mann alleges that the trial
court's failure to grant these motions constituted error, as the evidence is legally
insufficient to uphold the verdict attributing 100% of the fault to Ms. Mann and
completely absolving Fredrickson of any negligence. Accordingly, the issue of
insufficiency of the evidence is appropriately before this Court.
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III.

MS. MANN HAS RAISED THE APPROPRIATE ISSUES TO
CHALLENGE THE JURY VERDICT
Fredrickson argues that Mann failed to preserve the issue of proximate

cause as rendered by the jury. This argument is erroneous and unnecessary. The
jury's answer to the first question (the defendants' negligence) posed by the
special verdict form dictated the answer to the second question (whether
defendants' negligence proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries). Fredrickson
asserts that a reviewing court cannot go behind the answers of the jury to special
interrogatories and analyze or speculate as to the process by which the jury arrived
at them. Weber Basin v. Nelson, 358 P.2d 81 (Utah 1960). There is no analysis
involved in the review of the answers to the special verdict form completed by the
jury.
Here, the question of the defendants' negligence served as a threshold
inquiry, a positive answer required further action and a completely negative
response to this initial interrogatory essentially ended the inquiry. The judgment
on the verdict summarizes the answers to the interrogatories, and shows how no
analysis is necessary by the court to understand the jury's response to the question
regarding proximate cause. (See Judgment on the Verdict, attached hereto as
Addendum B).
The first question stated: "Were the Defendants, Samuel P. Fredrickson
and Riddle Services, Inc., negligent as alleged by Plaintiff?" The answer was
"No." The second question stated: "Was Defendants' negligence a proximate
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cause of the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff?" The answer here, "No." Having
answered the first question in the negative, the inquiry ended; having determined
no negligence on the part of the Defendants, the jury's answer to the remaining
questions was predetermined, it is nonsensical to make a finding that 0 negligence
proximately caused the injuries.
Ms. Mann maintains that the jury's answer to the initial inquiry is
inconsistent with and wholly unsupported by the evidence at trial. Based upon the
manner in which the jury was presented with the questions on the special verdict
form, the challenge to the jury's verdict regarding the threshold question of
liability is sufficient, and encompasses a challenge to the proximate cause verdict,
and can only be cured by the reversal of the lower court's rulings.
IV,

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 28 WAS IMPROPERLY GIVEN,
AS IT WAS CONFUSING, MISLEADING AND NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SERVE AS
DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF THE CASE.

The trial court erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 28. In addition to the
insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, the Appellant, respectfully requests
this Court to reverse the lower court's determinations, and order the district court
to set aside the verdict, vacate the judgment and grant a new trial based on the fact
that Jury Instruction number 28 was misleading, confusing, and unsupported by
the evidence.
To require a new trial on the basis of an improper jury instruction, it must
be shown that the erroneous instruction "was prejudicial, i.e., that it tend[ed] to
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mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or
erroneously advise[d] the jury on the law." Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000
UT App 239. As Appellant's counsel argued, Instruction 28 was misleading and
confusing to the extent that it was prejudicial to the Ms. Mann; it affected her
substantial rights, was inconsistent with substantial justice, and justified the
granting of a new trial.
A.

Mann Properly Objected to Jury Instruction No. 28.

Ms. Mann took timely exception to Instruction 28 at trial, giving the trial
court notice that the instruction was confusing, misleading, inappropriate to the
situation, and contrary to testimony. (R. 593, p.444). In order to appeal the giving
or refusal of an instruction, Utah law requires a party to object, and distinctly
state the matter to which he/she objects and specifically state the grounds for that
objection. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, 40 P.3d 1119, 1123. The
objection made by counsel for Ms. Mann was specific enough to inform the trial
court of the error in the instruction to the above standards established under Utah
law. Mann raised her concern with the subject instruction on multiple occasions,
and did so with the requisite degree of specificity.

~ Rule 51(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure establishes protocol for objecting to jury instructions, and
states that "In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party shall identify the matter to which the
objection is made and the grounds for the objection."
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B.

Jury Instruction No. 28 Was Misleading to the Jury and Was
Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence to Serve as Defendants'
Theory of the Case.

Ms. Mann has not contended that Jury Instruction No. 28 was an
improper statement of the law, but that it was inappropriate for the jury in this
action. Mann agrees fully that Fredrickson was entitled to an instruction on his
theory of the case. Under Utah law "all parties are entitled to have their theories of
the case submitted to the jury in the court's instructions, provided there is
competent evidence to support them." Pernios v. Covenant Transportation Inc.,
2004 UT App. 35, 86 P.3d 752, (citing Newsome v. Gold Cross Serv., Inc., 119
P.2d 692, 694 (Utah Ct.App. 1989)(emphasis added).
Ms. Mann's contention is that Instruction number 28 was unsupported by
the evidence; was confusing and misleading to the jurors, and improperly
influenced the jury to her detriment. The jury was left to speculate and consider
facts outside of the evidence presented to arrive at their verdict.
Instruction No. 28 contains multiple elements that create a duty, which
any leading driver would presumably owe to following vehicles. These elements
create a limited rather than generalized duty, one restricted to a set of
circumstances not proven in the present case. One of the essential elements of the
statute and corresponding instruction is the opportunity to give a signal.
Fredrickson presented no evidence at trial that Ms. Mann had an opportunity to
give a signal, and that, given this opportunity to signal, she failed to do so. Since
no evidence was presented to support this essential element, Fredrickson did not
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offer competent evidence to support this instruction as his theory of the case and
the instruction should not have been given. See Paulos, supra.
There is an appropriate time for the giving of an instruction like the one at
issue here, but there was insufficient evidentiary basis for it in this matter. The
administering of this misleading instruction, which was unsupported by the
evidence was confusing to the jury, was prejudicial to the Appellant, and resulted
in a verdict which was inconsistent with and contrary to the evidence.
Accordingly, the submission to the jury of Instruction No. 28 was not harmless
error and therefore Ms. Mann should be granted the relief sought on these
grounds.
CONCLUSION
Fredrickson attempts to complicate the issues and burden this Court with
arguments beyond the scope of those presented. In addition, Fredrickson does not
address or even acknowledge the unorthodox manner in which the trial court
upheld the verdict in denying Ms. Mann's Motion for a New Trial. There is no
evidence to support a verdict allocating 100% of the fault to Ms. Mann and 0% to
Mr. Fredrickson. The jury's verdict is unreasonable and unjust as it is entirely
inconsistent with the evidence presented. While the trial court demonstrated
sophisticated reasoning and creativity in forming its ruling on the Appellant's
Motion for a New Trial, Ms. Mann maintains that the court's dissecting and
contorting her testimony and combining it with that of Fredrickson to "salvage" a
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verdict unsupported by the evidence are actions which should not be condoned by
this Court.
Based upon the foregoing grounds, Ms. Mann respectfully requests this
court to reverse the rulings below, and to issue an order instructing the trial court
to set aside the verdict, vacate the corresponding judgment and grant the
Appellant's motion for a new trial.

DATED this ^fl'

day of May, 2006.
LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAM R. RAMJNGS

William R. Railings
Attorney fop/Plaintiff
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conditions, and type of traffic control).
i

f--;\!a«:>>\<)

^ 7 H;Vi

C^s

r.

&stJ<iy

rtc-i?^

far/ZSityL,

S^QPf
Signature

Witness to signature

READ C A R E F U L L Y BEFORE SIGNING. 1 hereby
Certify that all statements made in this witness statement
Are done voluntarily and are true and J understand and
Agree that any false statement will be prosecuted to the
Fuli extent of the law.
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SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
7351 S. Union Park Ave., Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 562-5555

SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

Deputy cierk

Attorneys for Defendant Fredrickson and Riddle Services, Inc.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LOUISE MANN,

JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT

Plaintiff,

SAMUEL P. FREDRICKSON, RIDDLE
SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1
THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE,

Civil No. 030916997
Judge Robert W. Adkins

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter was tried beginning June 6,2005, and continuing through
June 10,2005, before the Honorable Robert W. Adkins of the Third Judicial District Court.
A jury was duly empaneled. The Plaintiff, Louise Mann, appeared in person and through
her counsel, William R. Rawlings. The Defendants, Samuel P. Fredrickson and Riddle
Services, Inc., appeared in person and through their personal representatives respectively
and through their counsel, Albert W. Gray, of the law firm of Smith & Glauser, P.C.
Evidence was produced by each of the parties through testimony and exhibits on both
liability and damage issues.
At the conclusion of Plaintiffs evidence, Plaintiff rested.

Defendants moved for Directed Verdict, pursuant to Rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure on the issues of liability, personal property claims, future medical expenses, and
future loss of household services.
Plaintiff indicated that no claim was being presented for damages to personal
property. The Court entered Directed Verdict in favor of Defendants on this issue. The
Court denied Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict on the remaining issues.
Defendants then presented evidence in support of their defense to Plaintiffs claims.
At the conclusion of Defendants* presentation of evidence, Defendants rested.
The Court instructed the jury on the law applicable to the issues raised by the
pleadings.
The Court then submitted the issues to the jury on a Special Verdict. The jury,
having retired to consider the matter, and after deliberations, returned a Special Verdict as
follows:
1.

Were the Defendants, Samuel P. Fredrickson and Riddle Services, Inc.,

negligent as alleged by Plaintiff?
ANSWER: No.
2.

Was Defendants' negligence a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by

the Plaintiff?
ANSWER: No.
3.

Was the Plaintiff contributory negligent, as alleged by the Defendants?

ANSWER: Yes.
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4.

Was the Plaintiffs negligence a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries?

ANSWER: Yes.
DATED this 10th day of June, 2005.
/s/ Frank Christiansen, Foreperson
Plaintiff requested that the jury be polled.

In response to Special Verdict

Interrogatory Number 1, at least six of the jurors indicated that they had answered "No" as
to whether the Defendants, Samuel P. Fredrickson and Riddle Services, Inc., were
negligent as alleged by Plaintiff. Plaintiff requested that the jury be polled in response to
Interrogatory Number 2, was Defendants1 negligence a proximate cause of the injuries
sustained by the Plaintiff, but then abandoned the request after the second juror
responded.
Based upon the Special Jury Verdict:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Judgment be entered
in favor of Defendants, Samuel P. Fredrickson and Riddle Services, Inc., as a "No Cause."
THE COURT notes that Defendants filed an Offer of Judgment in the amount of
$100,000 on December 17, 2004, and the Defendants, by virtue of the No Cause and the
Offer of Judgment, are entitled to their taxable costs from the inception of the case to be
established upon submission of affidavits of the attorneys of Plaintiff and Defendants to
obtain such costs submitted to the Court for approval.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant is awarded
his taxable costs, to be established pursuant to Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to

3

be established upon submission of an affidavit of Defendants' attorney establishing such
costs, submitted to the Court for approval.
DATED this J J j

day of June, 2005.
BY THE COURT:
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Honorable Robert W. Adkins
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be sent via facsimile transmission and mailed,
postage prepaid, this /ff1^ day of June, 2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT to the following:
William R. Rawlings, Esq. (Fax: 495-2122)
LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS
11576 South State St, #401
Draper, UT 84020
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